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Thank you very much for giving me the 
opportunity to talk about my research on 
Graham Greene, Vietnam and The Quiet 
American. Do bear in mind that this is still 
work in progress. I would welcome your 
comments and suggestions, as well as your 
questions, at the end. Perhaps I should say a 
little about myself and how I ended up here.
Many years ago, I took History and 
English Literature as my degree, but then 
took the fork in the career road named 
History, completed my doctorate on the 
French war in Indo-China, and went on 
to become what is known in the trade as 
an international, or diplomatic, historian. 
Over the years I have written a good deal 
on Vietnam, as well as on the Cold War. 
But the love of literature never left me, 
and a couple of years ago, I began a project 
that fused the two, history and literature. 
Greene, Vietnam, and The Quiet American 
were my points of departure. 
But why? I think I was struck by the way 
that many readers seemed to look on the 
novel as fact–up to a point–as much as 
fiction. Not fact in that they believed the 
plot-line per se, but rather the background, 
the context, the big picture that Greene 
inserted, the real-life backdrop to the fic-
tional tale. If at a certain level the novel 
was being read as history, had not the time 
come to see how it measured up as history?
For now, although I am sure that most 
of you are familiar with the story, a brief 
“barebones” outline of the plot of The Quiet 
American may still be useful. The two 
main protagonists are Thomas Fowler, a 
cynical and opiated British reporter work-
ing out of Saigon during the French war 
in Indo-China, and Alden Pyle, an ideal-
istic and committed Cold War Warrior, 
the quiet American of the title, a member 
of the Economic Mission attached to the 
US Legation. Pyle is eventually exposed 
as a CIA agent secretly promoting a polit-
ical-military Third Force between the 
French colonialists on one side and the 
communist-led Viet-Minh rebels on the 
other, a revelation which seals Pyle’s fate. 
When a massive car bomb explodes in the 
center of Saigon killing and maiming inno-
cent bystanders, Fowler recognizes the 
handiwork of General Thé, the leader of 
Pyle’s Third Force. The bombing forms the 
backdrop to the climax of the novel, but it 
was also a real event, a case of fact and fic-
tion fusing. It occurred on 9 January 1952, 
and its aftermath was captured as Life mag-
azine’s picture of the week.
In the novel, Pyle and Fowler are on the 
scene within seconds of the explosion. Pyle is 
stunned. “It’s awful,”  he says surveying the 
carnage.  He then glances down at his shoes. 
“What’s that?” he asks, puzzled. “Blood,” 
Fowler says. “Haven’t you ever seen it 
before? . . . You’ve got the Third Force . . . 
all over your right shoe.”
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Fowler decides the time has come to do 
something about this meddling American 
before he does more harm. Fowler is 
also bitter because Pyle has stolen his 
Vietnamese mistress. So whether from 
political conviction or jealousy or a mixture 
of both, Fowler decides to use his contacts 
with the Viet-Minh to have Pyle assassi-
nated. He was, “a good chap in his way . . . A 
quiet American,” Fowler tells Vigot, the 
detective charged with investigating the 
murder. “A very quiet American,” Vigot 
agrees with grim Gallic irony.  
When it was published in 1955, the set-
ting of The Quiet American would have 
been familiar to many of Greene’s readers. 
The Viet-Minh victory over the French at 
the battle of Dien Bien Phu the year before, 
May 1954, had led to the settlement of this 
first Vietnam war. Vietnam was temporarily 
divided between a Viet-Minh north and an 
ostensibly noncommunist south, although 
the French retained significant political, 
economic and cultural influence south of 
the 17th Parallel. Nationwide elections 
were scheduled for July 1956 after which 
partition would end, the residual French 
presence would disappear, and the country 
would emerge reunited and independent. 
The elections, as we know, never took place.
Disillusioned, France withdrew ahead of 
schedule in 1955, leaving the United States 
to get on with building a separate anti-com-
munist state in South Vietnam. The refusal 
of the North Vietnamese to accept this 
territorial cleavage as permanent was the 
catalyst for the second—American—war in 
Vietnam. By the time it ended in 1973 more 
than 58,000 US servicemen had died. The 
human cost on the Indo-Chinese side was 
anywhere between two and three million.  
All of this obviously lay in the future 
when Greene’s novel first appeared, but 
commentators have nonetheless remarked 
on his predictive power, in particular how 
the character of Pyle encapsulated the 
combination of American arrogance and 
naiveté that produced the awful US war in 
Vietnam. Through the character of Fowler, 
Greene appeared to condemn the USA’s 
ability, born of ostensibly good intentions, 
to do great damage in the developing world. 
Given this leitmotif, one would not be sur-
prised to learn that the novel, although well 
received in Britain, came in for fierce criti-
cism in Cold War America, where reviewers 
bridled at the denigration of the US national 
character as personified by Pyle.  
For all its supposed anti-Americanism, by 
the 1960s The Quiet American was essential 
reading for US journalists working in South 
Vietnam. Pulitzer Prize-winning journal-
ist David Halberstam recently called it ‘our 
bible.’ Later, as the American war escalated, 
the novel became a standard text for the 
anti-war movement, which embraced it as 
a prophetic masterpiece about the perils of 
blind idealism run amok.
Leaving aside its cultural and contempo-
rary political resonances, how then does The 
Quiet American fare as history? This ques-
tion may seem inappropriate: as Greene 
himself remarked in the foreword to the 
novel, he set out to write “a story and not a 
piece of history.” Yet Greene did muddy the 
distinction between fact and fiction by writ-
ing in the first person, and by including more 
direct reportage than can be found in any 
other of his novels. In so doing he underes-
timated the desire of his readers—and here 
I borrow from the critiques of others—“to 
make fiction fact,” to have “fiction serving 
as history,” and to accept the story as “real 
fiction.” For those historians, however, as 
opposed to literary critics or cultural com-
mentators, who have engaged with the novel, 
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there is only one question worth asking: who 
was real-life model for Alden Pyle? 
Over the years, Edward Geary Lansdale, 
ad-man turned CIA agent and later all-
round Cold War celebrity, emerged as the 
“bookies’ favorite” even though Greene 
always rejected the Lansdale/Pyle thesis. 
In the 1990’s Greene’s authorized biogra-
pher Norman Sherry demonstrated, to my 
satisfaction at least, that Pyle’s views were 
a composite of attitudes the writer encoun-
tered in several Americans during his 
time in Vietnam in 1951–52. Of these, Leo 
Hochstetter, of the US Economic Mission, 
seems to have been the single greatest 
inspiration for Pyle’s political outlook, 
though not his manner and bearing.     
I want to ignore this Lansdale/Pyle 
non-debate. Instead I want to probe the 
novel’s rendering of history from another 
angle and ponder whether the Americans 
really were working behind French backs 
to promote a Third Force. But in research-
ing the US—General Thé relationship, I 
quickly discovered, to my surprise, that the 
British were also secretly fishing in Third 
Force waters too—and Graham Greene was 
in the fishing party. 
The way I would like to do all this is to 
tell the story of Greene’s first two visits to 
Vietnam, in 1951 and 1952, the period in 
which the novel is set and the period that in 
many other ways shaped the story.  As I pro-
ceed, I will interweave with this Third Force 
business. To the extent that I quote Greene, 
it will be less from The Quiet American and 
more from his letters and journals, which I 
was fortunate enough to be able to look at in 
Georgetown, Boston, and Texas.  
Greene went to Malaya in November 
1950, where his brother, Hugh, was head 
of UK Information Services during the 
early phase of the Malayan Emergency. 
But Malaya bored Greene and he decided 
to return to England via Vietnam in order, 
so he said, to visit an old friend, Trevor 
Wilson, who was then “our man in Hanoi,” 
British consul in Hanoi in North Vietnam.   
It was to Saigon, the capital of Cochin- 
china, southern Vietnam, that Greene went 
first, arriving on 25 January 1951. Greene 
got very excited. “This is the country,” 
he wrote in his diary. “What a sod place 
Malaya seems though this one is in greater 
danger.” Then again, the danger was a large 
part of the attraction. Malaya had been 
a disappointment in that respect, but in 
Vietnam Greene discovered not one but 
two wars, each deadly in its own way. In the 
north, in Tonkin, was the big war, the busi-
ness of armies. In Cochinchina the war was 
smaller in scale but still lethal, the business 
of assassins. On his second evening, Greene 
was invited to dine with General Jean de 
Lattre de Tassigny, who was both French 
High Commissioner and Commander-in-
Chief of the French Expeditionary Force, 
the man, he noted, who had “stopped the 
rot” in Vietnam. And what a lot of rot there 
had been to stop. 
(1.0 Greene, Phat Diem front, December 1951.)
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The French war had begun in 1946 as a 
colonial conflict—the French attempting to 
reassert their imperial primacy in the face 
of determined resistance from the com-
munist-led nationalists of the Viet-Minh 
under Ho Chi Minh. Five years on, however, 
with the United States supplying France 
with military assistance and the Chinese 
Communists providing similar aid to the 
Viet-Minh, the original colonial strug-
gle had acquired a Cold War complexion. 
Meanwhile the Vietminh army, the People’s 
Army of Vietnam (PAVN), commanded 
by General Vo Nguyen Giap, had devel-
oped into a formidable fighting force, and 
in autumn 1950, just a couple of months 
before Greene arrived, Giap’s forces had 
won a stunning series of victories, wresting 
control of northern Tonkin and securing 
their supply lines to southern China.
In December 1950, Giap turned his atten-
tion to the Red River Delta, the hub of the 
French position in the north, launching 
a massive offensive to smash the French 
defenses. With Hanoi imperilled, the French 
High Command ordered the evacuation of 
French civilians, a precursor, it seemed, to 
the complete abandonment of the north 
and with it any prospect of winning the war. 
It was at this point that de Lattre arrived.  
Dashing and debonair, the sixty-one-
year-old general came to Indo-China with 
a reputation for firm leadership, strate-
gic brilliance, temper tantrums, and great 
personal charm. He deserved the reputa-
tion. All the senior officers associated with 
the recent defeats were immediately fired, 
all talk of abandoning Tonkin was forbid-
den, and the French forces assured, “from 
now on you will be commanded,” all of 
which had an electrifying impact on French 
morale. After successfully repulsing the 
threat to Hanoi, de Lattre went on to lead 
the French to victory in three more major 
battles in the first half of 1951. Meantime 
in his political role (he was also High 
Commissioner) he assured the Vietnamese 
that their independence was safe in his 
hands. What independence?  
Two years before, in 1949, the French had 
persuaded the ex-emperor of Annam, Bao 
Dai, to abandon the casinos and fleshpots 
of the Cote d’Azur to become chief of state 
of something called the “State of Vietnam.” 
The State of Vietnam was given its indepen-
dence but only within the framework of the 
French Union. What this meant in practice 
was that while the French relinquished con-
trol of much of the internal administration 
of the Vietnam, they retained control over 
foreign, defense and commercial policy. De 
Lattre spoke of perfecting Vietnam’s free-
dom when the security situation allowed, 
but to many nationalists, and not just those 
involved with the Viet-Minh, the “Boa Dai 
solution” resembled a colonial con trick. 
Let us return, then, to Greene’s first 
meeting with General Jean de Lattre de 
Tassigny, their dinner date in Saigon on 26 
January 1951. The general turned out to be 
anxious to win greater US support for the 
(2.0 Greene with French air force maintenance crew, 1951.)
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war and knowing that his guest was work-
ing for the influential, opinion shaping 
Life magazine, he was exaggeratedly atten-
tive to his needs. Greene duly flew with de 
Lattre to Hanoi on 30 January 1951. The 
general immediately put a small plane and 
pilot at his disposal and encouraged him to 
overfly the delta defenses. That afternoon, 
accompanied by his friend Trevor Wilson, 
Greene set off, but in an entirely differ-
ent direction, to Phat Diem, sixty miles 
south of Hanoi. Phat Diem was a largely 
autonomous city-state abutting the Gulf 
of Tonkin. It was controlled by a Catholic 
Prince Bishop, Le Huu Tu, and when 
melded with the adjoining diocese of Bui 
Chu, effectively exerted spiritual author-
ity over 500,000 Catholics and wielded 
temporal power over much of the area’s 
remaining, mostly Buddhist, population of 
half-a-million. In 1945, the Catholic Church 
in Vietnam had backed Ho Chi Minh’s rev-
olution but when the Franco-Viet-Minh war 
broke out, and as the Viet-Minh’s commu-
nist outlook became more pronounced, the 
church shifted to a position of neutrality. In 
early 1950, the Vatican formally recognised 
Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam. In Vietnam 
itself, the northern Catholic bishops, led 
by Bishop Tu, paid lip-service to the cen-
tral government in Saigon, but in practice 
brooked no interference in their diocesan 
affairs. At the same time, Phat Diem’s vul-
nerable geographical position on the edge of 
Viet-Minh-controlled Thanh Hoa province 
obliged the bishop to employ a combina-
tion of diplomacy and trade with the rebels, 
especially in rice abundant in his territory, 
to keep the war at a distance.
If all else failed, the bishop had his own 
army of some 3000 troops, which was just 
as well as a concomitant of Tu’s pronounced 
nationalism was a refusal to allow the French 
base rights in his diocese. The Catholic 
Greene was captivated by Phat Diem, as was 
his friend and co-religionist Wilson. Greene 
also admired Tu’s independence: “my num-
ber-one enemy is the French,” Tu told him, 
“after which come the Communists.” On this 
first occasion Greene spent just thirty-six 
hours in this “medieval Episcopal principal-
ity” before returning to Hanoi on 1 February. 
But it was soon clear that his unscheduled 
excursion had vexed de Lattre: 
‘Slightly picked on’ and peppered with 
‘Godless anecdotes’, he wrote of his 
next meeting with the general. At the 
time he attached little importance to the 
Frenchman’s jibes but looking back he 
came to see the dinner as the moment when 
‘our relations began to cool’, an ‘inconve-
nience to me’ but a ‘disaster’ for Wilson.
The nature of this disaster would not 
reveal itself until mid-1951. For now, after 
spending a fortnight in Vietnam, Greene 
returned home but he was determined to 
return as soon as possible—he had fallen 
in love with Indo-China—and thanks to 
Life, which commissioned a piece on the 
war, he was back the following October, 
this time for a ten-week stay. The interval 
between his visits witnessed two important 
developments. The first came in April when 
the bishops of Phat Diem and neighboring 
Bui Chu suddenly took sides in the war, 
declaring for Bao Dai. Mounting reports 
of Viet-Minh persecution of Catholics else-
where in Vietnam seems to have persuaded 
the bishops to ally with Bao Dai and, by 
extension, the French. But Tu drove a hard 
bargain: the French agreed to provide finan-
cial subsidies to develop his armed forces, 
and meantime Tu was allowed to retain 
command of his troops and maintain his 
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veto on French bases in his territory. At the 
end of May 1951, the inevitable happened–
or inevitable once Tu had joined Bao Dai’s 
side. The Vietminh attached Phat Diem as 
part of a wider offensive in the southern Red 
River Delta. After a month of fierce fighting, 
the French turned back the offensive.
But de Lattre’s satisfaction was tarnished 
by events involving Phat Diem. Tu’s army had 
performed so poorly that it had to be rescued 
by French paratroopers at a cost in French 
blood. Afterwards an angry de Lattre accused 
Tu of withholding information about enemy 
troop movements in the build-up to the battle 
and insisted on the disbanding of the Catholic 
militia and its assimilation into the Army 
of the State of Vietnam. Grief for his son, 
Lieutenant Bernard de Lattre, who was killed 
in the fighting near Phat Diem, only intensi-
fied his anti-Catholic animus. The Vietminh 
offensive, and by extension Bernard’s death, 
owed much to the “treachery” of the bishops.
The second development in the inter-
val between Greene’s visits was the rise to 
prominence of Trinh Minh Thé, a shadowy 
presence in The Quiet American but also, 
Greene tells us, “real enough.” Indeed he 
was. At twenty-nine, Thé was Chief of Staff 
of the army of the Cao Dai, a southern-based 
religious sect that Greene had encountered 
at the start of the year. “They have a Pope, 
female cardinals, & their saints are Christ, 
Buddha, Mahomed, Victor Hugo & Auguste 
Comte,” he wrote excitedly to his brother 
Hugh. “They number 2,000,000 & have a 
private army which at the moment is on the 
side of the French.” The Cao Dai Holy See 
was in Tay Ninh, 60 miles north-west of 
Saigon, where Pham Cong Tac, the Caodaist 
pope, surrounded himself not just with car-
dinals of both sexes but sundry archbishops, 
bishops, and priests.
As for the sect’s eclectic pantheon of 
saints, this reflected its blend of Buddhism, 
Confucianism and Christianity. “We suc-
ceeded,” Tac maintained, “because we 
. . . perfected a first-rate religion. After all, 
what other can compete with ours, since we 
have picked the best points out of each and 
put them all together.” Certainly Caodaism 
was a religion of substance. Founded in 
1926, by 1945 it claimed perhaps as many 
as one-fifth of Cochinchina’s 4.5 million 
people as followers. 
The Cao Dai army meanwhile func-
tioned both as the Holy See’s defensive 
(3.0  Greene with French troops, Phat Diem, December 1951.)
(4.0 ‘My nice bishop . . .’, Le Huu Tu, 1951.)
(5.0  dedication by Tu (‘souvenir’) following Greene’s time in 
Phat Diem.)
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Truman—was looking for alternatives: an 
anti-Communist nucleus to build round if 
or when the French gave up the fight. Did 
this quest lead to Thé?  
In The Quiet American Pyle belongs to 
the US Economic Mission, which gives him 
his CIA cover. Or to give it its real-life acro-
nym, STEM, the “Special Technical and 
Economic Mission.” The STEM files in the 
US national archives—oddly neglected by 
historians—confirm that the mission had 
numerous contacts with the Caodaists of 
Tay Ninh and thought highly of them, but 
the files contain no evidence of the USA’s 
furnishing either the mainstream or dissi-
dent Caodaists with arms.
Intriguingly, British documents from 
the period, released after a Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) application, 
suggest that these denials may be too 
definite. The Foreign Office (FO) in 1951 
was in receipt of a steady flow of intelli-
gence suggesting that the Americans were 
“encouraging the formation of a separate 
Cao-Daist army” and officials agreed that 
the Saigon bombing was probably the 
unhappy consequence of US meddling. “I 
fear that there is nothing we can do about 
the foolishness of US Special Operations,” 
minuted the Head of the SouthEast Asia 
Department. But there the paper trail dies. 
That the United States was potentially 
interested in a Third Force would not come 
as a total surprise to those familiar with the 
Vietnam story, but what has not been pre-
viously acknowledged is the extent to which 
the British were also actively seeking alter-
natives to Bao Dai. But why were they?
In the early 1950s Indo-China was a 
place where British national interests and 
international responsibilities converged. 
On the one hand, the preservation of a 
non-Communist Vietnam as a barrier to the 
shield and, after the Franco-Vietminh 
war broke out, as an informal arm of the 
French expeditionary force.  In return for 
French subsidies, Caodaist forces—some 
15,000, with 20,000 reservists, in 1950 
far bigger that the Catholic militia of the 
north—policed those extensive areas of 
Cochinchina where the faith flourished and 
provided the main source of popular resis-
tance to the Communists in the south.    
Then, in June 1951, Colonel Thé-he later 
promoted himself to general, suddenly 
deserted the Holy See, disappeared into 
jungle with 2,500 troops and a stockpile 
of weapons, and soon began advertising 
his credentials as a Third Force leader. 
Henceforward, he declared his policy 
would be “non-cooperation” with the 
colonial regime or its puppet Bao Dai or 
the Communist-dominated Viet-Minh. A 
number of unpleasant acts of terrorism fol-
lowed, claimed by Thé’s self-styled National 
Resistance Front, including the massive car 
bombing in Saigon of 9 January 1952.   
In The Quiet American, it is Thé’s vio-
lent actions which allow Greene via Fowler 
to arraign the United States for its idiocy 
in mistaking “a shoddy little bandit with 
two thousand men and a couple of tame 
tigers” for a legitimate Third Force can-
didate. But were the Americans really 
cultivating the real-life Thé in 1951-52? 
What we know is that US policymakers 
were undoubtedly worried that the stunted 
independence bestowed by France on Bao 
Dai would be insufficient to win over a 
majority of non-Communist nationalists to 
the anti-Viet-Minh cause. It was no good 
focusing exclusively on the military front, 
Washington believed; the political front 
too needed attention. Even as it recognised 
Bao Dai in 1950, the US government—
the Democrat administration of Harry S. 
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spread of Communism to the rest of South-
East Asia was a general Western Cold War 
objective. On the other, Tonkin was the 
forward defense of Malaya whose value to 
an ailing UK economy was considerable. 
The French, from a British standpoint, 
simply had to hold the line.  But would 
they?  If the French absolved themselves 
of responsibility, who would be prepared 
to lead the anti-Communist resistance? 
The FO doubted that Bao Dai, the play-
boy emperor, was up to the job. So did the 
Secret Intelligence Service—but where the 
Foreign Office could see no alternative to 
the wretched Bao Dai, MI6, it appears, had 
in mind a Catholic solution. And Greene 
would himself be involved in its promotion.
These shifts in the Vietnamese kalei-
doscope in mid-1951 were witnessed by 
Greene at a distance. “I seem to have missed 
the bus in the last few weeks when Ho Chi 
Minh put on a big offensive,” he wrote to 
Hugh at the end of June 1951. “My nice 
Bishop was completely surrounded in his 
diocese and had to be rescued by parachute 
troops. It would have been fun to have 
been with him and seen him in a crisis.” 
He planned to return to Vietnam later that 
summer, but events got in the way.
In August he wrote again to Hugh: “De 
Lattre has become half crazy & wildly 
anti-Catholic since the death of his son.” 
This was indeed the case. The general now 
looked on Catholics as potential quislings, 
none more so than Trevor Wilson, whose 
return to Hanoi at the end of his annual 
leave had been blocked by the French 
authorities who accused him of secretly 
encouraging the northern bishops to adopt 
anti-French attitudes.
Greene eventually returned to Vietnam 
in October 1951, but when he next met de 
Lattre–in Hanoi on 30 October–he was 
immediately struck by the contrast in his 
demeanor compared with the start of the 
year. The general was aloof, dyspeptic, even 
rude. Greene attributed this to a combina-
tion of grief for his son, hostility to all things 
Catholic, and a touch of Anglophobia. But 
there was also the Wilson factor. “He was 
sincerely convinced that in some obscure 
way, connected with the Catholicism of 
W[ilson] and myself and our interest in Phat 
Diem, we had been partly responsible for his 
son’s death,” Greene wrote later. As a result, 
“Trevor was thrown out of Indo-China and 
the FO lost a remarkable Consul and the 
French a great friend of their country.” Trevor 
was innocent then. Or so Greene inferred. In 
fact, there is a lot more to the Wilson affair 
than Greene ever publicly revealed.
The first thing we must note in regard to 
the Greene-Wilson relationship is the espi-
onage common denominator. Greene, as we 
know, had joined Secret Intelligence Services 
(SIS) Section V, Counter-Intelligence, 
during the Second World War, but resigned 
in May 1944 and claimed later that he never 
had anything more to do with the “old firm,” 
as he called MI6. In actual fact he seems to 
have retained informal links to the intelli-
gence service right through to the 1980s, 
passing on information gleaned during 
his many foreign trips, often in return for 
financial remuneration. As for Wilson, he is 
almost as elusive and enigmatic as his good 
friend Greene, but I have managed to piece 
something of a biography from his private 
papers and other sources.
Arthur Geoffrey Trevor-Wilson—note 
the hyphen, but I will continue to refer to 
him as Greene did in print, namely, Trevor 
Wilson—was born in East Molesey in the 
Surrey stockbroker belt on 12 August 1903. 
After school he went straight into busi-
ness and banking and then, in 1939, at the 
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outbreak of war, he joined the Territorial 
Army, and within two years found him-
self assigned to SIS as counter-intelligence 
operative. Malcolm Muggeridge, who 
worked with Wilson in Algiers in 1942, 
remembered him as “about the ablest 
Intelligence officer I met in the war, with an 
instinctive flair for the work, including all 
the deceits and double-crosses involved.” 
In 1943 Wilson came back to England to 
work at SIS Section V’s London headquar-
ters, when and where his friendship with 
Greene dates from. Greene left SIS in 1944, 
and in 1945 Wilson joined Mountbatten’s 
South-East Asia Command, SEAC, and 
it was through SEAC that Wilson and 
Vietnam first encountered one another. At 
the end of the war in Asia and the Pacific, 
SEAC forces oversaw the formal surrender 
of Japanese troops in southern Vietnam 
while the Chinese nationalists did the same 
in northern Vietnam–Japan had occupied 
Vietnam in and after 1941.
Wilson was sent to Hanoi in November 
1945 to act as liaison between the British 
and Chinese forces, and over the next six 
months he met more-or-less weekly with a 
certain Ho Chi Minh.  
A close bond developed between them, 
as Ho’s surviving letters to Wilson confirm. 
But Wilson was also valued by the French 
for the way he represented their inter-
ests, and was even decorated by de Gaulle. 
Demobilized in 1946, he was immediately 
appointed to the diplomatic service, and 
presumably because of his intimacy with 
both the French and the VietMinh, he was 
sent back to Hanoi as British consul. Five 
years on, when Graham Greene arrived in 
Indo-China, he was still there.
As I have mentioned, Greene’s pub-
licly stated reason for visiting Vietnam in 
the first place in January 1951 was to see 
Wilson. But French security immediately 
questioned Greene’s motives and warned 
de Lattre that Greene was probably still 
on MI6’s books. On that first occasion the 
general let the matter ride, but by the time 
of Greene’s second visit in autumn 1951, 
he was a changed man. “All these English, 
they’re too much!” de Lattre complained. 
“It isn’t sufficient to have a consul who is in 
the Secret Service, they even send me their 
novelists as agents and Catholic novelists 
into the bargain.”
Whether de Lattre’s charge against 
Greene is truly merited will be considered 
shortly, but in the case of the consul he was 
quite right: Wilson, as intelligence histo-
rian Richard Aldrich has confirmed, was 
an undeclared “stringer” for the regional 
SIS chief in Singapore. Having said that, 
Wilson was not the spy he once was.
Always a heavy drinker, by the early 1950s 
Wilson was exhibiting signs of incipient 
alcoholism and had developed an unfortu-
nate habit when drunk of openly espousing 
views more in sympathy with the Viet-Minh 
than Bao Dai. Lucien Bodard remembered 
“a John Bull boozer–a living wine skin” 
who was fond of telling the French to their 
faces that the “whole people is Vietminh . . . 
you’re going to be defeated!” Such outbursts 
irritated the colonial authorities, attracted 
the attention of the Sûreté, and militated 
against his effectiveness as an agent.
Further releases of Foreign Office doc-
uments under the FOIA mean that we 
can now “flesh out” the story of Wilson’s 
downfall. In May 1951, Wilson was keen to 
gauge local reactions in Phat Diem to the 
Catholic hierarchy’s declaration of support 
for Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam and accepted 
a personal invitation from Le Huu Tu to 
spend three days in Phat Diem. Whatever 
he got up to there, de Lattre was soon on 
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the warpath, denouncing Wilson to the UK 
Minister in Saigon for his “meddling with 
the Catholics.” In July 1951, with de Lattre’s 
fury showing no sign of abating, and with 
Wilson on the verge of being declared per-
sona non grata, the FO decided to terminate 
his posting. But still the question remains 
. . . what, exactly, had Wilson been up to at 
Phat Diem that so enraged de Lattre?
With MI6 files closed we are left to fill the 
gap. Even so, the clues point towards the 
encouragement of a Catholic Third Force. 
But what does that mean–Catholic Third 
Force? In 1950, although Vietnamese-born 
bishops accounted for only four out of six-
teen Catholic bishops in total in Vietnam, 
they were responsible for more than half 
of Vietnam’s estimated 1.2 million faithful 
and, to quote recent research by Charles 
Keith, they “embodied a growing desire 
among many Vietnamese Catholics not 
only for a Church freed from its missionary 
past but also for a Church in a nation freed 
from its colonial past.” Phat Diem’s Bishop 
Tu personified this nationalist outlook. And 
Wilson was friends with Tu. Whether of 
his own volition or encouraged by MI6, he 
encouraged Tu to assert his independence 
of Bao Dai and of France.
The neglected Wilson-Greene corre-
spondence in the Burns Library at Boston 
College offers some further pointers. “I must 
not say much in an open letter,” Wilson 
wrote to Greene in March 1951, a few weeks 
after Greene went home, “but events have 
moved swiftly since your visit . . . [and] I 
find plenty of support . . . for the Catholic 
solution from quarters where I should have 
hardly expected it.” In May, Wilson wrote 
again of “fresh & interesting evolutions in 
Phat Diem & Bui Chu” and how the Catholic 
solution was “developing nicely.”
But this was as far as Wilson got. De 
Lattre denounced him as a spy and deported 
him from Vietnam. De Lattre, we should 
remember, also believed that Greene was 
Wilson’s co-conspirator, an accusation 
Greene vigorously denied in later years. 
However, as the Wilson-Greene correspon-
dence shows, Greene was certainly aware 
of what Wilson was up to in Phat Diem. 
More tellingly, there is an intriguing hint 
in a Greene letter to his mistress, Catherine 
Walston, at the start of September 1951, six 
weeks before his second visit to Vietnam. 
Greene said he had been contacted by 
movie producer and one-time SIS agent 
Alexander Korda.
‘The “old firm” have asked Korda if I’d do 
a job for them,” Greene wrote to Catherine. 
“I don’t know what. K’s arranging a 
meeting . . . .”
Short of gaining access to Greene’s MI6 
files, we can only guess as to what this job 
involved.  It is tempting to suggest that it 
had something to do with Phat Diem and 
the Catholic solution. As for Wilson, he lob-
bied the French authorities to be allowed 
to return to Indo-China so he could put his 
affairs in order. Eventually, in November, 
he was granted a temporary visa.   
Greene was already in Hanoi by then 
and, to start with, he looked forward to 
seeing Wilson again. But as the scale of de 
Lattre’s anger towards the now ex-consul 
revealed itself, he began to wonder if it was 
wise to make contact. French surveillance 
of Greene’s movements had become stifling 
and he was distressed that his freedom to 
operate as a journalist, never mind as an 
MI6 agent, was so circumscribed. Worse 
still, Wilson cabled that he was keen to go 
back to Phat Diem. “I wish to God T[revor] 
10
Graham Greene Studies, Vol. 1 [2017], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/ggs/vol1/iss1/16
107 Graham Greene in Love and War
was not following that plan of his,” Greene 
wrote. “I can see . . . that he’s only causing 
trouble not only to himself but to me & all 
his friends. Such a lot of trouble too.”
On 18 November Greene dined with de 
Lattre for the last time. “Gen[eral] asked 
me if I was a member of the Secret Service 
& associated in it with Trevor,” he wrote in 
his diary. “Felt he didn’t believe my denial 
. . . Said he had taken my part against the 
police but was worried by the reports they 
brought in. Accepted my word but does he? 
Felt I had not defended T[revor] enough, 
but the prejudices there are too great.” The 
next day de Lattre boarded an aircraft for 
France.  He would not return.  Diagnosed 
with bone cancer, he went home for medi-
cal treatment but died on 11 January 1952.
As he departed Hanoi, however, de 
Lattre insisted to an aide that Greene was 
a spy. “Why should anyone come to this 
war for four hundred dollars?” he asked, a 
reference to Greene’s Life fee. The sardonic 
answer Greene gave his readers in later 
years was that de Lattre had mislaid a zero: 
$4,000 was well worth the effort. As to the 
idea he was a spy, this, Greene maintained, 
was a figment of de Lattre’s grief-addled 
mind. Yet the denial does not fully con-
vince, not when CIA veterans have attested 
that he took on “a short-term operational 
assignment because Trevor was gone,” 
not when his journal for 1951 records a 
number of meetings with known members 
of the old firm, and when Norman Sherry 
is convinced that he was not only seek-
ing information but talent-spotting local 
agents, “as any good spy would do.”
I would like to close with a few words 
about the fate of the Catholic solution. 
When Greene first visited Phat Diem in 
January 1951 he had been moved and 
amazed. The strength of Tu and his flock 
“was an idea, and that idea love of their 
country. Christianity too is a form of patri-
otism. These Viet-Namese belonged to the 
City of God.” By the time of Greene’s next 
visit to Phat Diem, in November 1951, Tu 
and his Army of God had been humiliated 
and Greene’s romanticized image of the 
bishop had been shattered. He now took 
issue with Tu’s failure to address the social 
needs of his people: “Always money for 
Churches,” he noted in his journal, “never 
for hospitals or education.”
In Third Force terms, Catholicism and 
nationalism were all very well, but to compete 
successfully with the Viet-Minh, to win hearts 
and minds, as it were, Greene now recog-
nized the importance of tackling poverty and 
other social grievances. But the bishop “was (6.0,  7.0 Greene at orphanage, Phat Diem, 1951)
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only interested in building more and more 
churches.” He went back to Hanoi depressed.
But this was not quite the end of his 
Phat-Diem connection. Rumors soon 
abounded—well-founded—that Phat Diem 
had been over-run by the Viet-Minh. Sensing 
a journalistic scoop, he went back, arriving 
on 16 December 1951. The scene that greeted 
him was “shocking.” Ever since he first went 
to Malaya, Greene had been desperate to 
experience war in the raw. Now he had his 
fill: “never have I seen so many corpses.” 
After blundering into the no-man’s-land 
between the French and Viet-Minh lines, 
exposing himself to grave danger, the local 
French commander decided that a tall, 
gangly, nosy British novelist was a liability in 
a war zone and ordered him back to Hanoi. 
Photographs #1 and #3 courtesy of the Graham Greene collection, John J. Burns Library, Boston College, 
USA, of Greene in Vietnam 1951-1952.
Photographs #2,#4,#5,#6, and #7 courtesy of the Graham Greene collection, Georgetown University 
Library Special Collections, USA.
With this, Greene’s interest in this particular 
Catholic solution ended.
Henceforth the Americans would be the 
exclusive proponents of the Catholic solu-
tion, eventually alighting on Ngo Dinh Diem 
in 1954 as the chosen one. Still, as I hope I 
have shown, there was a brief period when 
the British were also active in this regard, 
and when Greene himself was caught up in 
the kind of plot and entangled with a cast 
of characters—imperious French generals, 
Catholic warrior-bishops, British secret 
agents—that would not have been out of 
place in one of his own novels. 
Fact in this instance was every bit as com-
pelling as the fiction it spawned. 
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